

# NFC Principles and Vulnerabilities

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


# The Ideal Electric Dipole

- Electrically small, i.e.  $\Delta z \ll \lambda$ , uniform amplitude current element.
  - Ordinary dipole is covered by integration over these elements.
- In the far field, a donut-like pattern bearing the vertical polarisation is produced.
- In general, its field has the following components:

$$\vec{E}_{edp}(I^{(e)}) = E_{edp,\theta}(I^{(e)}) \cdot \hat{e}_\theta + E_{edp,r}(I^{(e)}) \cdot \hat{e}_r$$

$$\vec{H}_{edp}(I^{(e)}) = H_{edp,\phi}(I^{(e)}) \cdot \hat{e}_\phi$$



(illustration purpose only)

# Ideal Dipole Element Radiation

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$$\vec{H}_{edp}(I^{(e)}) = \frac{I^{(e)} \Delta z}{4\pi} j\beta \left( \frac{1}{r} + \frac{1}{j\beta r^2} \right) e^{-j\beta r} \sin\theta \cdot \hat{e}_\phi$$


$$\begin{aligned} \vec{E}_{epd}(I^{(e)}) &= \frac{I^{(e)} \Delta z}{4\pi} j\omega\mu \left( \frac{1}{r} + \frac{1}{j\beta r^2} - \frac{1}{\beta^2 r^3} \right) e^{-j\beta r} \sin\theta \cdot \hat{e}_\theta \\ &\quad + \frac{I^{(e)} \Delta z}{2\pi} j\omega\mu \left( \frac{1}{j\beta r^2} - \frac{1}{\beta^2 r^3} \right) e^{-j\beta r} \cos\theta \cdot \hat{e}_r \end{aligned}$$


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$$\begin{aligned} &= \frac{I^{(e)} \Delta z}{4\pi} j\omega\mu \left( \frac{1}{r} + \frac{1}{j\beta r^2} - \frac{1}{\beta^2 r^3} \right) e^{-j\beta r} \sin\theta \cdot \hat{e}_\theta \\ &\quad + \frac{I^{(e)} \Delta z}{2\pi} \eta \left( \frac{1}{r^2} - j \frac{1}{\beta r^3} \right) e^{-j\beta r} \cos\theta \cdot \hat{e}_r \end{aligned}$$

# Electromagnetic Radiation Regions

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(illustration purpose only)

# The Small loop


- Electrically small, i.e.  $2\pi a < \lambda/10$ , uniform amplitude current loop.
- Can be modelled as an ideal *magnetic* dipole which is the theoretical dual of the ideal electric dipole.
- The duality equations follow.

$$\vec{E}_{mdp}(I^{(m)}) \equiv -\vec{H}_{edp}(I^{(m)}), \vec{H}_{mdp}(I^{(m)}) \equiv \vec{E}_{edp}(I^{(m)})$$

$$\mu_{mdp} \equiv \epsilon_{edp}, \epsilon_{mdp} \equiv \mu_{edp}$$

$$\beta_{mdp} = \omega \sqrt{\mu_{mpd} \epsilon_{mdp}} = \omega \sqrt{\epsilon_{edp} \mu_{edp}} = \beta_{edp}$$


note also  $\beta = \frac{2\pi}{\lambda}, v = \lambda f$



(illustration purpose only)

# Donut Pattern Again

- The duality with the ideal electric dipole tells us the *far field* has the donut-like form.
- The polarisation is reversed (!) - i.e. horizontal in place of vertical, now.
- In the *near field*, however, there is a significant radial component (cf. below).



(illustration purpose only)

## Long Story Short

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$$\vec{E}_{mdp}(I^{(m)}) = -\frac{I^{(m)} \Delta z}{4\pi} j\beta \left( \frac{1}{r} + \frac{1}{j\beta r^2} \right) e^{-j\beta r} \sin \theta \cdot \hat{e}_\phi$$

$$\begin{aligned} \vec{H}_{mpd}(I^{(m)}) &= \frac{I^{(m)} \Delta z}{4\pi} j\omega\epsilon \left( \frac{1}{r} + \frac{1}{j\beta r^2} - \frac{1}{\beta^2 r^3} \right) e^{-j\beta r} \sin \theta \cdot \hat{e}_\theta \\ &+ \frac{I^{(m)} \Delta z}{2\pi} j\omega\epsilon \left( \frac{1}{j\beta r^2} - \frac{1}{\beta^2 r^3} \right) e^{-j\beta r} \cos \theta \cdot \hat{e}_r \end{aligned}$$

# Magnetic Current of The Small Loop

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$$I^{(m)} \Delta z = j\omega\mu IS$$

$$S = \pi a^2$$

—based on far field equivalence


# Near, Far

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- Basing on the dominating  $E$ ,  $H$  field terms, it is useful to distinguish:
  - *Reactive near field (XNF)*, where the terms with  $(1/r)^2$  and  $(1/r)^3$  dominate. Energy is mainly stored and exchanged between  $E$  and  $H$ .
  - *Radiating near field (Fresnel region)*, where the  $(1/r)^2$  terms start to dominate, i.e.  $r > \lambda/2\pi$ . Energy is mainly radiated with unstable patterns, however.
  - *Far field (Fraunhofer region)*, where the  $1/r$  terms remain to dominate and the plane wave model can be used. Several conditions shall be met:  $r > 2D^2/\lambda$ ,  $r > 5D$ ,  $r > 1.6\lambda$ , where  $D$  is the largest antenna dimension. Energy is radiated with a distance-independent field pattern.

# Antenna Impedance


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$$Z_A = R_r + R_o + jX_A$$

- The input impedance  $Z_A$  describes the antenna from the lumped circuit parameters viewpoint. *This is also useful to describe the antenna field action observable in those different field regions in a handy condensed way.*
  - $R_r$  is the equivalent radiation resistance representing the energy emanated through the radio waves
  - $R_o$  describes the dissipative energy loss
  - $X_A$  reflects the energy exchanged back-and-forth with the reactive near field

# Passive NFC Coupling




[Finkenzeller, K., 2011]

# Contactless Micro-EMP Variant (NFCKill)

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


# NFCKill Near-Field Magnetic Pulse (35 mm axial distance)




- Roughly 30-times higher peak value than for a regular NFC terminal (ACR122) in the same setup
- Will further raise sharply when approaching a closer distance
- Static discharge-like sensing observed at < 1 cm distance, their cause and effect remains unknown


- Probably, there is a high-voltage generator discharged instantly into a primary coil, producing typical high-energy transients




# Initiator Speaking NFC-A




# Initiator Speaking NFC-B



# Target Response NFC-A



# Hacking Avenue



## IC Card / ID Card Copier/Writer/Reader



13.56MHz 125KHz  
English Voice


Copier

Color screen with  
day effect.


## 125KHz RFID ID Card Copier



# Unique-ID Transponder Overview



# Another Practical Scenario: **Eavesdropping in Elevator**




LF band transponder data intercepted while its holder was authenticating to the reader in an elevator.

Distance: cca 0,5 m.

Receiver: Sangean ATS 909W.

# HF UID Interception

- Yellow trace: basic carrier
- Green trace: AM detector



All You NEED Is *LOOP*

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# Spying in The Lane (Still in XNF)



[<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9QjxwejBPHs>]


# SDR Sniffer - Hardware Setup

ACR122 NFC reader


Simple telescopic antenna (untuned - a place for improvement)

NooElec HAM It Up upconverter


RTL-SDR v.3



# Radio Definition in Simulink



# Identifying Miller Code Symbols (REQQA)



# Attack in Changing Room

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# Another Real Life Scenario

Danovy doklad c.: PD-08-002-5396  
DUZP: 1.12.08  
██████████, s.r.o.  
PS-08-002-9080 ██████████ ██████████ 1.12.08 11:07

1x Zampionova polevka	29,00	A
1x Cocka se sazеныm vejcem	69,00	A
1x Bonaqua neperliva 0,5l	20,00	A
<b>Sleva 5%</b>	-6,00	
<b>CELKEM</b>	<b>112,00</b>	


3cf2e2da9000 15 ROSA TOMAS  
Zam. Karta 112,00  
9% DPH/VAT 9,30 (102,70) 112,00 A

Puvodni zustatek: 395,00  
Novy zustatek: 283,00

UID  
here



# PicNic & CPLD Coprocessor



# Relay Attack Illustrated




Client inspired banking



**Victim**


**Attacker A**

near field inductive coupling  
in between the *leech* and *V*'s card  
distance < 0,5 m (cf. following discussion)



**interconnection  
network**

far field radiative coupling  
(wifi, bluetooth, GSM, etc.)



**Attacker B**

**Merchant's Term.**

near field inductive coupling  
in between the *ghost* and *M*'s terminal


Contactless transaction with no PIN verification is assumed.



# Relay Attack Scheme



Client inspired banking



Leech	Fake PCD
Leech host	Computing device driving the leech
Ghost	Fake PICC
Ghost host	Computing device driving the ghost

# Wormhole in Access Control

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


# Policie vyšetřuje nové typy zneužití platebních karet

Článek

02:43

i



nicméně je to technologie průlomová, která jaksí posouvá další hranice ochrany čipu

01:07 / 02:43




# Policie vyšetřuje nové typy zneužití platebních karet

Článek

02:43

i



jako takového. Je zde i technologie novější, která se právě na prostor, kde se přikládá

Přehrát

Přehrát

01:14 / 02:43







# Person-to-Person payment cards share

Contactless Payment cards sharing between two linked persons.

Currently on Android Mobile phones with NFC readers.

- 🔗 Person-to-Person link. ✓ No hidden fees.
- ✓ No geographical limits.



## Secure NFC card payments

The application uses mobile phone's **NFC** reader on one side to read contactless card, transmit card data to the linked remote person's mobile phone, allowing to **TAP & PAY** with mobile phone like if the cardholder pay with his original card.

- 🛡️ Secure communication. ✓ Card data encryption.
- ✓ Life card processing.



## HandyPay Wormhole

81447152		81462224		Rdr		03	80	EA	00	00	04	A2	00	B4	34	00	62	E1		A ok					
81907396		81912132		Tag		F2	01	91	40											A ok					
81922272		81927040		Rdr		F2	01	91	40											A ok		S (WTX)			
82372148		82376884		Tag		F2	01	91	40											A ok					
82386896		82391664		Rdr		F2	01	91	40											A ok		S (WTX)			
82836772		82841508		Tag		F2	01	91	40											A ok					
82851504		82856272		Rdr		F2	01	91	40											A ok		S (WTX)			
83064180		83083828		Tag		03	80	0A	28	53	E8	E4	00	05	00	96	00	10	90	00	59	C5		A ok	

$\Delta \approx 120.7$  ms


## Bare Payment Card

12953104		12968176		Rdr		03	80	EA	00	00	04	80	B7	A3	5C	00	C3	03						A ok		
12976852		12996564		Tag		03	80	0A	B2	88	DE	30	00	05	00	96	00	10	90	00	A4	6E			A ok	

$\Delta \approx 3.2$  ms

# Distance Bounding Protocol - Core Idea (one of)

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# Thank you for your attention

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**Supported by ECCC**

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## History (year-month-day format)

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- 2026-04-27, version 1.0 released for CAMP at MFF UK