




# Unmasking the Signal of e-Mask Applications

Tomáš Rosa

**Cryptology and Biometrics Competence Centre, Raiffeisen BANK**


# eRouška - Covid-19 Contact Tracing Application of Czech Republic




- Based on the [Google-Apple Exposure Notification](#) framework (GAEN)
- Framework is available and well-adopted worldwide
- Public health authorities of particular states can provide their own:
  - user interface application
  - risk assessment parameters
  - servers collecting keys of COVID-19 positive users



# Privacy Preserving Cryptographic Protocol



# One-to-One Exposure Tracing Infrastructure






# BLE Packet Payload

---


Flags			Complete 16-bit Service UUID			Service Data - 16 bit UUID				
Length	Type	Flags	Length	Type	Service UUID	Length	Type	Service Data		
0x02	0x01 (Flag)	0x1A	0x03	0x03  (Complete 16-bit Service UUID)	0xFD6F  (Exposure Notification Service)	0x17	0x16  (Service Data - 16 bit UUID)	0xFD6F  (Exposure Notification Service)	<b>16 bytes</b>  <b>Rolling Proximity Identifier</b>	<b>4 bytes</b>  <b>Associated Encrypted Metadata</b>

# BLE Advertisement Packet Assembly


Flags			Complete 16-bit Service UUID			Service Data - 16 bit UUID				
Length	Type	Flags	Length	Type	Service UUID	Length	Type	Service Data		
0x02	0x01 (Flag)	0x1A	0x03	0x03 (Complete 16-bit Service UUID)	0xFD6F (Exposure Notification Service)	0x17	0x16 (Service Data - 16 bit UUID)	0xFD6F (Exposure Notification Service)	16 bytes Rolling Proximity Identifier	4 bytes Associated Encrypted Metadata



**BLE MAC**




# BLE Radio Spectrum



advertising

connection





# All-to-Perimeter Exposure Tracing


---

- Besides instructing people to install the mobile application and follow its instructions, we can do more
  - install extra Bluetooth scanner(s) to capture the public anonymous advertisement packets in a broader perimeter area (up to cca 250 m radius for one scanner in free space)
  - download the temporary exposure keys on daily basis - the same way as regular mobile applications do
  - perform localised matching to disclose **the fluctuating number of risky encounters in the whole perimeter on timely basis**
  - these devices can also help to **detect large-scale radio attacks**, such as false alarms and suspicious jamming



# Raspberry Pi Zero W Based Scanner - Alpha

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# Raspberry Pi Zero W Based Scanner - Beta (Autumn 2020)





# Coalesced & Sorted Exposure Notifications (Bluetooth Channel)

---

```
(base) macwell:adv tom$ head -n 200 QTH-Petrovice/2020-11-12-1.adv | tail -n 20
```

```
1A03D3EC6CD84304E2E3BD6DFA0C77CB -90 239
1A2668643B886B303FF9083E44371CCF -87 11
1A44BF5486660A68CEE5BA27D8B3E906 -82 58
1AD6F166D46B9748F73427CF6E7CF6BF -89 6
1B166452EEA0A9B62C9415099D22FAD8 -84 9
1B5A04BAF5ED70FAC199E8206E3095D8 -76 242
1B640D0E9F06D389F1F0530348A16761 -84 4
1BA6A70850AA93A92001517E5FD41F5C -86 1
1BEB810145572B7792FAF73F0226D919 -77 32
1BF4CFBCCABD47807F4B5EB2E5CC4446 -88 1
1C06AA94E8C96CD1DAF5DE86CB632FB8 -67 4057
1C181C202CAA2C4F209050A07E6F1758 -65 3970
1C3913C6F995DC5B4AE2AD02669C8F1D -83 74
1C57A9FB507F86763E52616183783E9F -88 6
1CA6AC08440395652D67924657E7179B -81 29
1CD2130342B54EF950CFBD7F42F69C0D -79 166
1CDA8E4B863D6972730C28E47698A44B -83 16
1CEB5B083B53E615316D99671C428CED -87 16
1CFEAE6E0408A801E6A5A776C67EA7A6 -93 1
1D06E3C193367651A46DA4F0F2869557 -91 2
```

# Daily Temporary Exposure Keys Export Batch


---

```
(base) macwell:cz tom$ ../../../../bin/kfsp < 1605312000-1605398400-00001-export.bin | head -n 20
[+] ----- Temporary Key Export -----
[*] 2020-11-14 01:00 (local) 2020-11-15 01:00 (local) CZ 1 1
[+] -----
000162133CF00D3ADF63F97468F2E34E 2 2674080 [2020-11-04,01:00] 144 1 -5
0004E41FC86A5415A849D473BB90F363 2 2673792 [2020-11-02,01:00] 144 1 -10
001CDF6C7C6FEBF549638D7D0FE74C38 2 2674080 [2020-11-04,01:00] 144 1 -8
0058D9BCC9E088A9E09FABB7121428C1 2 2673792 [2020-11-02,01:00] 144 1 -10
005C9CB54881376634C1A2D0A7B6DE0D 2 2674800 [2020-11-09,01:00] 144 1 -3
007E8CA38BC363FADC33081CF4C82A70 2 2673936 [2020-11-03,01:00] 144 1 -8
00A03DD2B08EE4D4BEEE0C3740E281C0 2 2675376 [2020-11-13,01:00] 144 1 3
00A6A0A72A15C39DBA591AA07385B286 2 2673648 [2020-11-01,01:00] 144 1 -2
00CC1ACEE564E0EB7BCC48828152A30E 2 2674656 [2020-11-08,01:00] 144 1 -4
00DDFB94F975AD0FB81EFACD9FE73764 2 2673648 [2020-11-01,01:00] 144 1 -12
00FC55ED1B73C7B121E2D55BF6156F2A 2 2674224 [2020-11-05,01:00] 144 1 ?
010D1AE37D96F9200EC7E294294D0FF1 2 2674368 [2020-11-06,01:00] 144 1 0
01136CEB5905B105C94460F40038C2A7 2 2673936 [2020-11-03,01:00] 144 1 -9
0145ED6A53DCAF1B86E8D10EF6D96FDE 2 2674368 [2020-11-06,01:00] 144 1 -5
014973333D1FFD602488DB9375CBFF85 2 2674224 [2020-11-05,01:00] 144 1 -4
016665E391AF3BB563C9E9C5DB2844EB 2 2675088 [2020-11-11,01:00] 144 1 2
0178FF9829B6CCD0DB5E8A8364B2614B 2 2674944 [2020-11-10,01:00] 144 1 -2
```

# Real Match

```
(base) macwell:cz tom$ ../../../../bin/kfsp < 1605312000-1605398400...  
...  
7FC18B829AE9F91B0CA1870C5C253C8C 2 2673504 [2020-10-31,01:00] 144 1 -11  
7FC206064BA6F5F9D666D16FF116E7E0 2 2674800 [2020-11-09,01:00] 144 1 0  
7FCFB233659F5E79057F2CF5191A5D34 2 2674656 [2020-11-08,01:00] 144 1 -4  
7FD5BC66FB6D59A6E16B3DEA7CE348D5 2 2674656 [2020-11-08,01:00] 144 1 -4  
...  
daily key export
```


```
(base) macwell:adv tom$ cat QTH-Petrovice/2020-11-09-1.adv Bluetooth scan  
...  
035A6EC1C5916B1B881C6ADC273C46FE -92 4  
03F82E7A6A3951E0EA27200F2C8B31EB -84 1  
0415DFE65EACD88769BD33B9CCC4A42D -82 25  
042AF6B7C44131B721147D83BADCDA34 -83 14  
...  
1F324B33C004BA505A78BC8DE8FAE3B5 -82 96  
1F3C10FC4025FB6166DA0A7190AC033E -83 223  
1F3C963CA5B177D0B4F...
```




```
(base) macwell:cz tom$ rpigen 7FC206064BA6F5F9D666D16FF116E7E0 2674800 144 ...  
...  
24211A70A7969270A3952278574C5AC961A255B78AFC3EA1E81 5165918E 2674809 [2020-11-09,02:30] 7FC2060...  
2480BE59291D66698DBE2CA96374C0DB 56899872 2674810 [2020-11-09,02:40] 7FC2060...  
24C616A59E08DCDE9BE076F3AEDFEA4359A6A5326111ABC0EC4 4C324595 2674811 [2020-11-09,02:50] 7FC2060...  
24D5BD7E8CB3AC70BA21F3C10FC4025FB6166DA0A7190AC033E 9FDA7FD3 2674812 [2020-11-09,03:00] 7FC2060...  
...  
ABF3B6D6C75C7A9A98BE8760FE2A7B85 BF9D4341 2674813 [2020-11-09,03:10] 7FC2060...  
03F82E7A6A3951E0EA27200F2C8B31EB 5B418588 2674814 [2020-11-09,03:20] 7FC2060...  
764AEDB26481CECF7FB506AD04E71B8E FC8F9D2D 2674815 [2020-11-09,03:30] 7FC2060...  
...  
rolling proximity identifiers
```



# RADAR-like Traces








RSSI [dBm]	< -97	-97..-88	-87..-78	-77..-68	-67..-58	-57..-48	-47..-38	> -38
Symbol	.	+	o	*	X	X	W	@





RSSI [dBm]	< -97	-97..-88	-87..-78	-77..-68	-67..-58	-57..-48	-47..-38	> -38
Symbol	.	+	o	*	x	X	W	@

# RSSI Model

---

- Let RSSI denote the value provided by the Read RSSI Command via BLE HCI.
- Basing on the formula derived above, we can write:

$$RSSI(d) = RSSI(d_0) - 10n \log \frac{d}{d_0} + X$$

- ▶  $d_0$  denotes the calibration distance,
- ▶  $n$  is a model parametrisation constant ( $n = 2$  in the free space), referred to as the *attenuation factor*
- ▶  $X$  is a random variable covering fluctuations



# Privacy Unfriendly Tracing

---

B7FD84CABD33BBA2A8C63E6F3543C0F5	2	2674944	[2020-11-10,01:00]	144	1	-12	TEK export batch
184654C1FEFCC438F1AA3E96EE583570	2	2675088	[2020-11-11,01:00]	144	1	-11	
569D45C1496DA0621DB59C2EAC1C4DA8	2	2675520	[2020-11-14,01:00]	144	1	-8	
36625AFD45BEE8B9284DAC70F1A34E67	2	2676096	[2020-11-18,01:00]	144	1	-4	

B874ABD699E626F9157B042BDB318EB8	28BE9DCD	2675003	[2020-11-10,10:50]	B7FD84CABD33BBA2A8C63E6F3543C0F5	coalesced Bluetooth log match
7D7A86C9C9AF7E6A11A535A84791715E	6AB69909	2675012	[2020-11-10,12:20]	B7FD84CABD33BBA2A8C63E6F3543C0F5	
D2DD38C040C28F97FAE8CD00D46902C3	0F34D0E5	2675031	[2020-11-10,15:30]	B7FD84CABD33BBA2A8C63E6F3543C0F5	
9BC7A4973870B4E318133D699F50B9BE	F31393AE	2675032	[2020-11-10,15:40]	B7FD84CABD33BBA2A8C63E6F3543C0F5	
73256A76764EE1153BF51173FFC17132	C8E01768	2675035	[2020-11-10,16:10]	B7FD84CABD33BBA2A8C63E6F3543C0F5	
C51037B69F3B8F8DB5DB6429AA06A241	8CBDCDBB	2675140	[2020-11-11,09:40]	184654C1FEFCC438F1AA3E96EE583570	
F736701ABB9EAD8EE4F10A4E2D56CBC0	CE5D6D7E	2675159	[2020-11-11,12:50]	184654C1FEFCC438F1AA3E96EE583570	
9FE961D758776D10417C371DE1ABD953	84C1E820	2675160	[2020-11-11,13:00]	184654C1FEFCC438F1AA3E96EE583570	
6F71F3D60849D692567F32B7818BF1EB	B2F5DB50	2675606	[2020-11-14,15:20]	569D45C1496DA0621DB59C2EAC1C4DA8	
241E8453D776B64D050AC14974E7F121	9E4DEE2E	2676148	[2020-11-18,09:40]	36625AFD45BEE8B9284DAC70F1A34E67	

4F:2B:2A:5A:EF:2F	B874ABD699E626F9157B042BDB318EB874579DCD	1605001929	S	-89	Bluetooth uncut log (snippet)
4F:2B:2A:5A:EF:2F	B874ABD699E626F9157B042BDB318EB874579DCD	1605001930	S	-86	
4F:2B:2A:5A:EF:2F	B874ABD699E626F9157B042BDB318EB874579DCD	1605001931	S	-83	1605001929 ~ 2020/11/10 10:52:09 (local)
4F:2B:2A:5A:EF:2F	B874ABD699E626F9157B042BDB318EB874579DCD	1605001931	S	-88	1605007834 ~ 2020/11/10 12:30:34 (local)
4F:2B:2A:5A:EF:2F	B874ABD699E626F9157B042BDB318EB874579DCD	1605001933	S	-89	
4F:2B:2A:5A:EF:2F	B874ABD699E626F9157B042BDB318EB874579DCD	1605001933	S	-91	
4F:2B:2A:5A:EF:2F	B874ABD699E626F9157B042BDB318EB874579DCD	1605001933	S	-87	
60:12:E7:07:81:94	7D7A86C9C9AF7E6A11A535A84791715E365F9909	1605007834	S	-91	delta increments are in seconds
60:12:E7:07:81:94	7D7A86C9C9AF7E6A11A535A84791715E365F9909	1605007836	S	-94	
60:12:E7:07:81:94	7D7A86C9C9AF7E6A11A535A84791715E365F9909	1605007841	S	-89	
60:12:E7:07:81:94	7D7A86C9C9AF7E6A11A535A84791715E365F9909	1605007841	S	-84	
60:12:E7:07:81:94	7D7A86C9C9AF7E6A11A535A84791715E365F9909	1605007842	S	-87	
60:12:E7:07:81:94	7D7A86C9C9AF7E6A11A535A84791715E365F9909	1605007843	S	-84	



## By the way: OTP Security

---

- One-time password required for the exposure keys upload
  - valid OTP allows for easy TEK pullout (tracing) and large-scale false alarms (poisoning)
- OTP of 8 decimal digits observed
  - if there is just one valid OTP ready to use, the success probability of a random guess is expected to be  **$10^{-8}$**
  - if there would be, however,  $10^4$  OTP ready to use, this probability then grows to  **$10^{-4}$**
  - so, this authentication mechanism does not scale securely





# GAEN Threats and Vulnerabilities Summary (*probably incomplete*)

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- ✦ **Massive false alarm - pretending fictional super spreading events by a relay attack or OTP brute-forcing**
- ✦ **Jamming - hiding real super spreading events**
- ✦ **Privacy breach**
  - RADAR like tracking and recognition of kinetic activity in a given perimeter
  - RIP rollback (time-shift regeneration) and TEK pullout attacks in general
  - individual trace and activity reconstruction after TEK public exposure
  - social patterns - Who Acquires Infection From Whom (WAIFW), etc.




# Observing Localised Exposure Risk Factors (workbench ideas)





# Office Exposure Field and Its Anonymous Updates



# Thank you for your attention

Přednášející: **Tomáš Rosa**  
Společnost: **Raiffeisen BANK, CBCC**  
E-mail: **easy to guess**



# PANELOVÁ DISKUZE

## TRENDY V INFORMAČNÍ BEZPEČNOSTI

# Revision History

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- 2022/06/07 ~ public release at Security 2022